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!
Abstract 
!
! This paper looks at whether something more than the system of individual 
rights is required to uphold justice for the members of immigrant minority groups 
in liberal democracies and states. Chapter 1 of the paper looks at whether group 
membership in general provides value for individuals, because if it does not then 
there is no need for extra protection, as it is not desirable. On the basis that 
groups and group membership is valuable in some way, chapter 2 examines 
whether any extra protection is required, and if so what forms it could exist in. 
The overall argument of the paper is that while group membership is on the 
whole valuable for individuals, no extra system of group rights is required to 
ensure that justice is upheld for the members of minority groups. Groups cannot 
make claims as separate entities, as the only entitlements they are able to claim 
are on behalf of their individual members. The existing system of individual rights 
and universal standards of justice is suﬃcient as it stands. 
!
Introduction 
!
! This paper will argue that while membership of minority groups is largely 
beneficial for the individual members of those groups, no extra protection in 
terms of group rights is required. If individual rights are upheld properly, then 
members of minority groups should receive just as much protection as any other 
individual in society. Members of minority groups are often regarded as being 
unfairly discriminated against, which impacts on their ability to attempt to fulfil 
their goals and ends in the way that liberalism envisages ensuring that all citizens 
are able to do. If this failure of justice is constant, then it is argued that more 
needs to be done to ensure a level playing field. !  	  3
This paper is made up of two chapters, the first looks at the value of group 
membership and the second at both the need and methods for extra protection. 
My position is that while group membership is generally valuable for individuals 
in terms of allowing them to satisfy their ends and interests, groups themselves 
are neither inherently valuable nor do they require extra protection. This is 
because they are not distinct entities that have their own interests and 
preferences, i.e. there is no special form of group that can make morally relevant 
claims above that of its members. Any goods or benefits that do come from 
groups are only valuable in that they serve the interest of individual members.!
!
There are a number of qualifying points I would like to make before 
looking at the main arguments. Whenever the abbreviation MC is used, it stands 
for minority culture. While this paper is focused on immigrant MCs, a lot of 
arguments do apply to the notions of groups generally. Words such as ‘group’, 
‘culture’ and ‘community’ are to be understood as being interchangeable with MC 
throughout this paper, unless specified otherwise.!
As I’ve already mentioned, this paper will be focusing on immigrant MCs, 
ones who have left their original state or society to come to a western liberal 
democracy. These are ascriptive groups, usually ethnically based. An ascriptive 
group is one where membership is not based on achievement or choice, but pre-
determined and normally inherited characteristics. This includes sex, but the 
examples in this paper will primarily be ones concerning race. This paper is not 
concerned about voluntary or interest groups. The fact that the paper is focusing 
on immigrant MCs is important to keep in mind, as a significant portion of the 
existing literature on minority rights has looked at indigenous MCs and their 
relation to liberal states. Indigenous MCs are often argued as having more of a 
claim to exemptions from certain liberal standards and laws, as their communities 
have often predated the existence of a liberal state. Whereas for immigrant MCs, 
the fact that they have made a conscious choice to move a liberal state could 
mean that they have less grounds for arguing that standards of justice should be 
changed to accommodate any cultural and group diﬀerences. That is not to say 
that any changes of this type are automatically ruled out for immigrant MCs, just 
that they are unable to use the same sort of historical argument in the same way.!  	  4
Regarding standards and laws, another clarification that needs to be made 
is that when any arguments in this paper refer to universal standards of justice, I 
am using the phrase to refer to the idea that all individuals should enjoy the same 
rights and freedoms in a liberal state. While diﬀerent laws may vary from state to 
state, the underlying principles and rights are regarded as the same, usually in 
reference to the Convention of Human Rights and everything it stands for. What 
I am not referring to is a Kantian system of natural rights and laws that are 
discoverable through applied reason, or any other meta-ethical claims. Any 
standards of justice in liberal states are understood as being politically 
constructed and upheld through the eﬀorts of people within states, and the 
various institutions that have been designed to do this.!
A final clarification concerns the nature of the liberal state itself. 
Defenders of extra protections for MCs claim that one of the reasons why MCs 
seem to suﬀer a disproportionate amount of injustice is because the structure of 
the liberal state is inherently biased against those who may be members of groups 
that are not constructed around liberal ideology, and who may not be members of 
the dominant culture. My stance throughout this paper is that the liberal system 
and structure is inherently politically and culturally neutral. This is not a universal 
position within liberalism, for example some theorists such as Joseph Raz argue 
that some ways of life are more valuable than others, and liberalism is the epitome 
of them all. If that were the case, then liberalism would be inherently biased 
against non-liberal groups and organisations. I do not subscribe to this. Any 
problems that arise from liberalism are the faults of the individuals within the 
system, not an inherent bias of the system itself. This worry is still a legitimate 
one, and will be looked at later on in the paper, but my view is that liberalism and 
its system of rights are neutral. The reason for its widespread adoption by states is 
that it is one of the most eﬃcient political systems for upholding justice.!
!
Keeping the above points in mind, it is evident that I support the position 
that any injustice suﬀered by members of MCs can be rectified and prevented in 
future though upholding the current system of individual rights to the required 
standard. Specific group rights and protections are neither possible nor needed in 
terms of moral rights and justice. That is not to say concessions and exemptions   	  5
cannot be made for the members of MCs on cultural matters. There is a 
distinction between legal and moral standards, with legal ones being easier to 
alter, and anything that can be done to encourage greater toleration and 
cooperation between members of diﬀerent groups should be encouraged. But any 
attempts to change the universal standards of individual justice to accommodate 
certain groups will fail, and in doing so threaten to create tensions between 
members of diﬀerent groups in society.!
!
!
Chapter 1 – Value 
!
! It is necessary to start by looking at whether membership of groups, 
cultures and communities is valuable, because only then does it allow for 
investigation into whether members of MCs require extra protection beyond that 
of individual rights. According to most interpretations of Rawls, liberalism and 
liberal rights are put in place to allow individuals the freedoms to both choose 
and then accomplish the ends they believe to be valuable. In other words, 
individuals are ‘project pursuers’ inside the realm of the state. Diﬀerent people 
obviously have diﬀerent conceptions of what is valuable and what the ‘good life’ 
entails. This is the reason for the existence of rights such as freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press, etc. The government has to treat people as 
equals in order to ensure that each individual has an equal opportunity to 
determine and achieve their goals, fulfilling their most important interest(s). 
Therefore if cultural and communal membership is never of any value to 
individuals, it would not be worth considering protecting in liberal theory. !
!
! Examining the value of groups can be broken down into three sections:!
A). Does membership provide value to the individual members of the group? If 
culture as a whole does not then it would be counterintuitive to grant extra status 
to something that no one in a society values, regardless of what that culture is.!
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B). Are MCs their own distinct entities, with interests separate from those of its 
members? This is a form of non-reductionism, where some argue that a group’s 
well-being has to be separate from the aggregate well-being of its members, and 
that there are certain goods which aren’t fully reducible to the benefit of 
individuals.!
C.) Are all groups and cultures equally valuable? If they are diﬀerent, can we 
accurately measure or determine which ones are more valuable than the others? 
And if so, who determines which groups are the most deserving of extra 
protection?!
!
! My position is that while group membership is for the most part very 
important, any good or benefit that is generated is reducible to the good it 
provides for the individual members. Groups are not distinct entities that have 
interests and claims outside or above that of its members. While a lot of goods 
and value for individuals are produced as a result of the collective structure of 
groups, it is possible that individuals can attain some of these goods on their own. 
Even the goods that are only attained or enjoyed collectively aren’t inherently 
necessary for individuals to thrive. This is essentially a reductivist position, and 
one that is opposed by several writers.!
If this is the case, then it follows that some groups provide more benefit to 
individuals than others, making them more valuable and possibly more deserving 
of protection. This has implications for both the existence and implementation of 
collective/group rights, which will be looked at in chapter 2.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Section 1 – Individual Value.!
!
! While the exact nature of MCs and how exactly they provide value for 
individual members will be looked at later, this first section looks at the diﬀerent 
interpretations of why groups are valuable for individuals and also why liberalism 
is detrimental. Communitarians believe groups are necessary for individual 
flourishing in a variety of ways that is not provided though liberal individualism, 
whilst others argue that individuals are not as reliant on group membership as 
they’re made out to be. With members of migrant MCs it is arguable that this 
issue is magnified in importance, as their native group could be the only thing 
familiar to them in a new society. If so, it needs to be determined why.!
!
Section 1.A – Identity and choice 
! !
The first, and most important, benefit MCs and groups generally are 
meant to provide is the necessity of groups for developing an individual’s identity 
and their ability to make choices. The prevailing culture and group that an 
individual belongs to is often seen as playing a crucial role in determining how 
that individual is identified in relation to the wider world. People do not just have 
random interests and conceptions of the good; their cultural heritage plays a role 
in determining what they think is valuable. Communitarians advocate this as a 
central part of human existence. Michael McDonald argues that membership of a 
community does not just help people define what is valuable; it partially defines 
their identity as a whole (Kymlicka, chap.12, 1989). Another communitarian, 
Charles Taylor, argues that if this follows then group membership actively sustains 
the freedom of individuals (Kymlicka, chap.5, 1989). If groups help define identity, 
then they’re required for individuals to be truly autonomous. A person with no 
group or community to belong to will lack the sense of purpose and shared 
ambitions that groups are said to provide. All that is left is just an aggregation of 
interests without a proper sense of how they arose and where they belong.!
Non-communitarians also acknowledge the importance of group 
membership. Both Will Kymlicka and Amy Gutmann argue that group 
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  8
membership provides the context for the choices people make about their ends 
and goals. Gutmann (1985) says that a dividing line is often drawn between who 
people are versus what they want, in other words between their identities and 
their ends. But she thinks that the first informs the second, and our choice of 
ends is informed by our identity, which is in turn informed and partially defined 
by our cultural heritage. In her words, “Identity alters the perception of our 
interests” (Gutmann, 1985). Chandran Kuthakas, while he argues against 
communitarianism, accepts that any conception of an individual has to 
presuppose some form of society in order for it to be accurate (Kuthakas, chap.
10, Kymlicka ed., 2007). Even though the foundation of liberalism is based on the 
primacy of the individual, it appears that the definition of an individual is not 
complete without some reference to the society and/or group the individuals are 
members of. !
!
This might be a concern for defenders of the importance of the individual 
within liberalism. But the response from a majority of them is that while a 
person’s group has an influence on both their identity and the context of their 
choices, it is not a completely defining one. Kymlicka (1989) claims that group 
membership aids the choices of individuals, but individuals ultimately still choose 
their own ends. Their cultural influence is important, but it does not mean our 
identities and by extension our choices are fixed. This is an empirical observation 
to an extent. Take any large cultural group and it is extremely rare that you would 
find a complete homogeneity of goals and ends. Even accounting for diﬀerent 
sects of a particular culture, there will always be individuals within a similar group 
who will not have the exact same set of ends. There will be overlap due to shared 
heritage, but not to the extent that one can look at an MC and proclaim them to 
all have the same conception of the good and the same shared ends.!
Another issue that defenders of liberal individualism point to is that while 
it is definitely important to ‘have a culture’ or at least possess some form of group 
membership, there is nothing that says that it has to be limited to just one group.!
Jeremy Waldron (chap.5, Kymlicka ed., 2007) argues that people ‘need a culture 
but not cultural integrity’. In the modern globally interconnected world, it is rare 
that a person is just the product of a single culture or group. They may be born in   	  9
one state but particularly enjoy the lifestyle or cultural interests of others, often 
simultaneously. Communitarians advocate community membership without 
defining the scale of said community. Is it a town, region, country, ethnic group? If 
they are not able to give a strict definition, then there is no reason why a person 
cannot partake in and draw influences from all of them. If so, then cultural 
heritage is drawn from their choices more than their upbringing. Waldron 
believes that focusing on a single culture to the exclusion of others is a form of 
deliberate self-isolation and withdrawal from the world as it currently stands. In 
his words, it is ‘inauthentic’ (pp.101, Kymlicka ed., 2007).!
! !
In particular response to Waldron, communitarians and advocates of the 
deep-rooted identity theory can oﬀer a couple of counter points. The first, as 
Waldron acknowledges, is that if individuals do need to be tied to a single culture 
then Waldron’s view will lead to shallowness and alienation. Drawing influence 
from a multitude of groups can lead to confusion and internal conflict. A person 
wouldn’t be suﬃciently connected to any community to gain any worthwhile value 
out of it, and would be confused by the clashing interests and ends of the various 
groups. Waldron’s response is that from looking at history, it is clear that the 
interaction between various groups has had a more profound impact on people 
and the formation of their ends than arises from complete isolation (pp.103, 
Kymlicka ed., 2007). Civilization as we know it today was drawn from aspects of 
diﬀerent communities across the world. For example, in Western Europe we use 
the Arabic numbering system and the Latin alphabet. It wasn’t formed by a single 
culture set apart from the others. It therefore makes more sense to adopt a 
cosmopolitan perspective on the issue rather than an isolated one. In response to 
Michael Sandel’s criticism about being a manager without character, Waldron 
invokes the idea of self-governance instead. It is true that there may be clashes 
between the influences and ends of diﬀerent cultures, but people suﬀer from 
internal conflicts all the time. Character and identity develops from governing 
these conflicts and ensuring that the chosen path is the one that best serves one’s 
interests.!
A second response from the communitarians is that this cosmopolitan 
cherry picking of cultures could be the result of a single cultural heritage, namely   	  10
from living in a liberal democracy in the 21st century. The desire for a person to 
choose their cultural interests can be traced back to a single cultural expectation 
of people to do so. Previously when global interaction was much more limited, 
there was not a societal expectation for people to broaden their horizons. It was 
only once there was a capacity to interact with ‘foreign’ communities that we 
chose to do so. But the problem with this is firstly that in order to get to this 
point, it is necessary to go incredibly far back in human history. Diﬀerent 
communities have been interacting and adopting practices from one another for 
millennia, and would result in the communitarians advocating primal hunter-
gatherers as the truest embodiment of a community. Secondly, people in societies 
have nearly always been influenced by outside communities, whether they had any 
personal experience of them or not. Any adoption of foreign technology, custom 
or tradition counts as a secondary cultural influence. Western Europe and the 
Middle East adopted gunpowder from the Chinese without most people at the 
time ever having any direct contact with the Chinese people. It is odd that many 
communitarians criticise the atomistic and isolating nature of liberalism and 
stress the importance of group membership, yet are perfectly happy to hold a 
view that endorses atomistic communities with outside interaction not being 
regarded as having any particular influence. It is not implausible but it still is 
quite unrealistic, particularly in today’s globalised world. It is very diﬃcult for 
groups to remain untouched by the wider society they exist in, given how 
widespread liberal states are now. Even then, this paper is focusing on migrant 
MCs, who by definition have come into contact with other cultures and groups 
by moving from their native society or state.!
!
Section 1.B – Belonging and Security 
  
The second type of value groups can provide to its members is a sense of 
solidarity and social-worth. People can feel proud of who they are in part because 
of the group they belong to. Sandel claims that the roots and traditions people 
have within groups are important, it gives individuals a sense of security and the 
feeling that there are others willing to help and identify with them based on a 
shared membership. Importantly, in most cases this membership is not based on   	  11
any form of accomplishment or merit. Most people tend to be born into their 
group heritage, others join through marriage or family relations. It allows even 
the most unfortunate and vulnerable individual to feel wanted and needed. !
! Gutmann (2003) also raises the point that individuals tend to achieve more 
in groups than on their own, particularly with regards to social change and 
upheaval. While the Civil Rights movement was characterised by individual acts 
of supreme courage, such as Rosa Parks, actual change and acceptance came 
about as the result of a large group of like-minded people working together to 
overturn the status quo. Admittedly the Civil Rights group was a largely voluntary 
group, whereas most ethnic minorities and other MCs tend to be ascriptive, but 
the principal remains similar.!
! Defenders of individual liberalism can accept this to a large extent. While 
individuals should be as free as they want to be, isolation can have negative 
consequences for a person’s well-being. It is probably a good thing that most 
people will have a group they can identify with, regardless of the past choices they 
have made. Group membership can provide support in times of distress, guidance 
and advice uniquely applicable to members of that group, and a sense of solidarity 
and togetherness. But just because groups have traditions that provide a sense of 
solidarity for members of that group, it does not follow that these are inherently 
good and need to be maintained throughout the future. Gutmann (1985) argues 
that even if there are some common ties and traditions that bring people 
together, it does not mean they are worth keeping today. She points to examples 
of women and homosexuals being excluded from many roles and institutions 
within liberal democracies. Just because historically this brought the majority of 
people closer together, in the long run it is hard to see them as beneficial. While 
most traditions are beneficial or at least harmless, the fact that something is a 
tradition does not automatically entitle it to preservation.!
!
Section 1.C– The drawbacks of liberalism 
! !
The previous two sections have looked at the ways in which group 
membership confers benefits on individuals. This section looks at a negative 
argument. The criticism that liberalism often faces from the advocates of these   	  12
benefits is that due its focus on individuals, it fails to take into account any of the 
benefits of groups and as a result lacks any formal recognition and protection 
within liberal theory. Even though it is argued that we need this group 
membership to thrive, liberalism does not encourage it in any way. Gutmann 
(1985) acknowledges that without groups, society becomes purely atomistic. 
Liberalism permits this with the right to free association, but does not go any 
further in promoting it. Kymlicka (pp.211, 1989) agrees that liberals often 
misconstrue the idea of groups and communities. They are confused for private 
clubs, where people opt in and out voluntarily. This is not the case; the vast 
majority of cultural groups in society are involuntary. Following from this, 
communitarians can make the point that if liberalism places no emphasis on the 
importance of group membership, then it seems individuals do not have a 
requirement to participate actively in either society or the state. Complete apathy 
towards one’s fellow citizens is an acceptable existence under liberalism, whereas 
it obviously is not for communitarians focused on the workings of the state. 
Theorists examining indigenous and smaller tribes might not be so alarmed, as 
isolation from other members and other groups could be a normal feature of 
those cultures. In a state, a day-to-day existence like this might not be a problem, 
but apathy towards others is potentially an issue when dealing with state business 
like referenda and elections. If a person does not care about anyone else, it seems 
hard to see how they can be in a position to decide not what is just best for them 
but also for the rest of the country.!
! Again, liberal defenders may agree that apathy is not a particularly 
desirable state of existence. But to enshrine the importance of groups within 
liberal theory could have some troubling consequences if applied incorrectly. 
Namely, forced association. Kukathas (chap.10, Kymlicka ed., 2007) points out 
that while individuals do have the freedom to associate, they also require the 
freedom to exist separately from one another if they desire. Some people are 
drawn to a life of solitude, and forcing them to interact with one another can be 
reasonably seen as a breach of liberty. With regards to matters of the state, an 
argument can be made that citizens have obligations to one another to ensure the 
state’s mandate is the most democratic one possible. This is highlighted by the 
problems of low voter turnouts in liberal states, and whether any attempt should   	  13
be made to improve it. Adopting the Australian policy of compulsory registration 
at polling stations on voting day has been put forward. Most people seem to agree 
however that while it may remain problematic, it is a citizen’s free choice to 
participate or not. The real problem would come by trying to force people to 
interact on the basis of involuntary groups. As I wrote earlier, being part of a 
group does not necessitate that everyone in it has the same ends and goals. For 
that reason, individuals may decide that participation in the group does not help 
them to further their interest(s). Any attempt to encourage or force them to do 
could arguably be seen as a breach of individual rights. It is up to the individual to 
choose what they think is the best way to live their life and what will prove, most 
valuable to them. It is not up to the state to tell them that it consists of group 
membership, even if this happens to be true in some cases.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Section 2 – Group/cultural entities and value!
!
! Group membership then has the potential to be beneficial for individuals 
with regards to personal identity and the context of choice, and most of the time 
it is. But some authors want to go beyond that and say that groups and thus MCs 
are inherently valuable in of themselves. That is, there are group interests and 
traits that go beyond the aggregate interests of the individual members. They 
claim groups are not wholly reducible to the aggregation of its members. Rather, 
they are distinct entities with their own benefits and interests separate from the 
individual interests of its members. The implementation and protection of MCs 
becomes even more of an important issue if this is true. Not only do members of 
groups need protecting but the overall entity would need some formal protection 
as well.!
!
Section 2.A – Non-reducible goods and entities 
! !
The first argument that groups are distinct entities with their own 
interests and benefits is that there seem to be some cultural and collective goods 
produced from groups that are not reducible down to an individual level. These 
include things such as languages and traditions, collectively pursued projects, and 
the broader benefits that cultural pluralism brings to society as a whole. For 
example, a language is useful in that it allows a group of people to communicate 
eﬀectively. This is a collective benefit, the good of which can be seen on an 
individual level. But languages are often described as more than a simple tool for 
communication, they are regarded as having importance in their own right. This 
is because they often contain nuances and aspects of identity of the groups that 
use it, and is seen as part of the shared heritage that is passed down from older 
generations. This sort of good is hard to reduce to an individual level, in that 
while individuals do benefit from it, its main value comes from ensuring that 
there is a continuous link not just to other users of the language but also with 
previous generations. That is why it is considered detrimental when languages die 
out. The last native speaker of the Cornish language in the UK, Dolly Pentreath, 
died in 1777 (Cornwall Guide, 2015). Another more abstract example of this would   	  15
be to imagine a person living in a pluralist cultural society. They are part of the 
dominant cultural group, and never really interact much with members of MCs. 
Yet they benefit from the wider tolerance and understanding that a pluralist 
society promotes.!
! Trying to accurately explain these goods can be diﬃcult, yet most people 
have some form of instinctive understanding about the importance of them. But 
if they aren’t reducible to an individual level, then it is not likely that they come 
from a mere aggregation of individual interests. There has to be more to it than 
that. Owen Fiss (1976) provides an explanation of why this could be. According to 
Fiss, groups are more than just aggregation if they possess two characteristics. 
Firstly, a group is an entity if it has a distinct identity and existence apart from its 
members. In other words, groups and MCs are ‘more than the sum of their parts’. 
And secondly, if the group possesses the condition of ‘interdependence’, in that 
the well-being identity of both the group and its members are linked. In other 
words, members both identify themselves with and determine their health in 
relation to that of the group as a whole. Good examples are people who identify 
themselves as Irish-American or Italian-American. On a purely individual level 
they are simply U.S citizens, but part of their identity is tied to groups that have 
strong cultural traditions and heritage both within US society and external to it in 
their native countries. It can be argued that a community such as a nation is 
formed only when its members self-identify as one. Fiss’ theory has been further 
refined recently but the basic premises remain unchanged. !
! Another good that group and in particular MC membership is claimed to 
provide is anti-homogeneity. If there are multiple MCs in a society it implies it is 
a culturally pluralist society, and not just a single all-encompassing culture. Not to 
say that the society is anti-state or anti-government, just that it prevents one 
culture or group from dictating every aspect of society without regard to the 
minorities within it. Why is this beneficial? Walzer (chap.6, Kymlicka ed., 2007) 
gives three main reasons. First, it provides a defence against cultural nationalism. 
There have been many examples in the past where nationalism was used as an 
excuse to oppress minorities and ensure that society only benefited individuals 
from certain groups to the detriment of the others. In a modern democratic 
society where every individual possesses the same rights and freedoms, this would   	  16
obviously be unacceptable. The second reason is that a pluralist society allows for 
celebration of identity. Members of MCs can feel proud of their heritage and 
where they come from without fear of recrimination or reprisals. Particularly with 
immigrant MCs, it allows members to have a sense of social solidarity and 
connection in a new society that can often seem strange and awkward to non-
nat ives . Third l y, i t a l lows for MCs to ‘bui ld and susta in the reborn 
community’ (pp.147, Kymlicka ed., 2007). It gives the freedom to convince others 
as to the benefits of a particular MC and lays the foundation for creating 
institutions and structures that will ensure the flourishing of the MC in the 
future.!
! Ultimately, if it is the case that groups and MCs are distinct entities and 
they provide non-reducible benefits, then some will argue that it is necessary to 
prioritise the benefit of the group over that of the individuals. This is obviously 
the position that a lot of communitarians hold. In cases where the interests of an 
individual and their group clash, then on balance communitarians would argue 
that the group be given the benefit of the doubt. Otherwise, they argue that the 
benefits the rest of the group receives are in danger of being removed in the name 
of protecting single individuals. !
!
Section 2.B– Determining group entities 
!
The first response from critics of this view and defenders of individualism 
within liberal democracies is this: if cultures and groups are distinct entities that 
transcend the aggregation of their members, then how do we determine or find 
out exactly what they are? What tools do we have at our disposal for examining 
them? This presents a greater problem for the communitarian position than is 
perhaps realised. Kymlicka (chap.12, 1989) refers to authors such as Taylor 
prioritizing the health of the group above that of its members, as I’ve already 
discussed. But it surely seems that the well-being in terms of morally important 
interest satisfaction of the group is determined wholly by the well-being and 
success of its members. If true, then it seems like some form of reductionism is 
possible, contradicting the idea that groups are distinct entities. If not, then what 
device or analysis can be used instead? Communitarians might advocate   	  17
something like cultural flourishing or prosperity, but I’d argue that is not always a 
good indicator. Historical empires like the British or Roman ones arguably 
provided great conditions for development of new cultural heritage and traditions 
because they provided stability, but I would think there would be few people 
willing to swap living in a non-pluralist democracy for a pluralist empire. It is up 
to the communitarians to provide a suﬃciently plausible answer to this, which 
they haven’t done yet in my view. !
! Taylor (1997) might respond with something along the lines that a group or 
MC is confirmed as a result of self-determination. This is definitely the case on an 
international level. Much attention is drawn to the plight of self-determined 
minorities within oppressive states, such as the Kurds in various Middle Eastern 
states. But on what scale is this applicable? This is again Waldron’s (chap.4, 
Kymlicka ed., 2007) point. Does every subset of every form of group and 
community generate its own entity and cultural identity? Or is it only the ones 
that are granted the appropriate status by the state? There are problems with 
both options. The first allows for every clique and subset of every community to 
claim to generate a distinct group/cultural entity, and so claim oﬃcial minority 
status. This is neither workable on a practical level, nor is it desirable as it would 
potentially diminish the help and support that could be given to MCs that 
actually need it. The second option seems to be overly restrictive. As pointed our 
by Lijphart (chap.12, Kymlicka ed., 2007) the state already makes it hard enough 
to determine who the actual minorities are. By forcing citizens to identify along 
very broad simplistic categories, such as British Asian in the UK, the state 
actually blurs the lines between existing minorities that will lead to less nuance 
and more heavy-handed solutions. If both of these prove problematic, then the 
self-determination explanation provided is not enough to fully distinguish 
genuine minority groups from mere sub-sects.!
! The communitarian might accept that it can be diﬃcult to accurately 
determine the boundaries or well-being of a group entity, but they’d still argue 
that the entity itself and its collective interest are there. It is just diﬃcult to spot 
them. But even that basic premise is up for debate. Kukathas (chap.10, Kymlicka 
ed., 2007) denies that groups are either completely fixed entities or have fixed 
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and historical context of the society at the time. Again, for example, when people 
of south Asian origin first moved to the UK in large numbers during the Post-War 
period, they were generally referred to as a single group and treated as such by the 
majority of the population. Yet as time passed and European states on the whole 
became less culturally homogenous, the diﬀerences between the various 
communities was noted. The 1991 census ‘was the first UK census to have a 
question on ethnic group’ (Oﬃce for National Statistics [ONS], 1991). And as for 
fixed interests, Kukathas rejects this as he advocates the idea that while there are 
certain aspects of cultural groups and communities that aren’t reducible to 
individual interests, the most important claims, namely moral ones, only matter 
because they are reducible to the eﬀects they have on individuals. Group interests 
therefore only matter because individuals do. As a result, group interests can 
never be fixed because the individuals within groups are always changing.!
!
Section 2.C – Individually reducible 
! !
This brings us neatly onto the second response that is already been stated 
by Kukathas: that all the important aspects of cultural and group membership, 
namely the moral claims, goods and interest that arise are reducible to individuals. 
So any group interest only has moral weight based on its eﬀects on the members 
of that group. In Kukathas’ own words: !
“…Thus, while groups or cultures or communities may have a character or 
nature which is not reducible to the nature of the individuals who inhabit them. 
Individuals do not exist in the abstract any more than interests do. But interests 
matter only because individuals do. Thus while groups or cultures or communities 
may have a character or nature which is not reducible to the nature of the 
individuals who inhabit them, their moral claims have weight only to the extent 
that this bears on the lives of actual individuals, now or in the future” (pp.234, 
chap.10, Kymlicka ed., 2007).!
Membership of MCs and groups might be the only way to attain certain 
goods and benefits advocated by communitarians, but that does not mean that 
those goods exist independently of the individuals that enjoy them. And if 
individual states of existence are the only morally valuable ones, that would mean   	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that MCs only have value insofar as they are mechanisms that deliver such 
individual states. There are definitely collective benefits and characteristics that 
transcend individuals and the pursuit of their ends, but they are not morally 
relevant interests in terms of justice. They tend to be things like language and 
tradition, important social constructions but nothing that has a direct impact on 
determining whether an individual’s interests and ends are satisfied.!
There is a further potential issue with accepting groups as having their 
own distinct identities. If a group collective interest exists, one that is separate 
from the aggregated interests of all the individuals in that group, it raises the 
possibility that the collective interest of the group could clash with the majority 
of personal or individual interests in the group. (Interests in this sense generally 
refer to an entity’s chosen conception of the good life and what the best way to 
achieve it is). This would be a rare situation, but one that is definitely possible. In 
essence, it would rely on an elite within the group that judges only itself able to 
work out the best interests of the group. Any other individuals who complain are 
then deemed either ignorant or incapable. It is hard to imagine an example in a 
liberal democracy given the dictatorial nature of this situation. Perhaps any form 
of theocratic society, or the oligarchs in Russia after the collapse of communism. 
Bear in mind I’m not arguing that communitarians want this to occur, most of 
them are as committed to democracy as any liberal theorist. But it is an 
important consideration to take into account if they’re arguing that groups have 
distinct identities and interests and that these should be prioritized over the 
interests of an individual.!
!
Section 2.D – Homogeneity  
!
The final response in this section is to the claims that MCs provide value 
in preventing homogenous societies. Communitarians and others who seem to 
think that is in itself a good thing. But I argue that homogeneity is only a negative 
if it has come about as the result of oppressing and driving out MCs and other 
vulnerable sections of society who were already citizens, or if it is the result of 
aggressive policies designed to minimise migration. But if it has occurred over 
time due to a mix of geography, cultural diﬀerences and other factors, then how   	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can it be deemed inherently negative? Take South Korea for example. It is 98% 
ethnically Korean (World Population Review, 2015), and while like a number of 
other Far Eastern countries it can be quite conservative and inward-looking, this 
demographic hasn’t come about as the result of government expulsion of ethnic 
minorities or unequal rights or anything so oppressive. More foreigners are 
moving there for work opportunities. It just seems odd in contrast to the very 
ethnically diverse states of Europe and the USA. !
Building on the points raised earlier in this section, I’ve discussed how 
prioritizing the interests of group entities, if they exist, over that of individuals 
could be potentially dangerous for individual liberty. One reason is that to do so 
relies on homogeneity. By prioritising the collective interests of a group, you’re 
assuming that everyone in that group shares in those it interests and ends. But 
I’ve already raised the objection that it is very unlikely that this is the case, 
especially for non-voluntary groups such as MCs. If not everyone shares those 
ends, yet collective ends are prioritised over allowing people to carry out their 
individual ones, then those individuals are subject to the same pressures that 
communitarians argue MCs face in homogenous societies. Leslie Green (Chap.11, 
Kymlicka ed., 2007) points out that minorities themselves normally aren’t 
homogenous. There are minorities within minorities, diﬀerent factions and 
subsets that are still minorities yet wouldn’t necessarily be protected under law. To 
grant MCs the rights and protection to prioritise the apparent collective interest 
of their group above the interests of individual members could lead to internal 
oppression, and all in the name of preventing oppression from the dominant 
culture. This relates back to Waldron’s scale problem, trying to determine on 
what level MCs are considered legitimate and entrenched enough to possess a 
collective identity and the interests that come with it, and at what point they 
warrant protection. !
!
There are a number of problems that arise from the premise that groups 
are their own distinct entities. Using this as justification for prioritising the good 
of the group over the benefit and freedom of individuals has potentially worrying 
implications for civil l iberties and individual freedoms. I accept how 
communitarians and other who share this view can regard individual rights as   	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isolating and not truly representative of how society can benefit people. But there 
is not enough evidence and too many problems to support the theory that groups 
have their own distinct identities, so I stand by the view that the value of group 
membership comes from the benefit it brings to individuals via the satisfaction of 
their interests. It may be the case that some of these benefits cannot be realised 
by individuals on their own, and groups provide the only mechanism for doing so. 
This would make groups valuable in that they are the unique source of these sorts 
of goods. Not because the group, as a distinct entity, has its own morally valuable 
interests. !
!
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Section 3 – Equal value of groups/cultures!
!
! The debate presented in this paper so far has largely been between 
communitarians on one side, arguing for the importance of groups over 
individuals, and liberal egalitarians on the other advocating the primacy of the 
individual. But at this point some of the diﬀerences become less definitive, as 
generally opposite thinking authors can hold similar views, but for diﬀerent 
reasons. Particularly when regarding the equal value of groups, both sides think 
that determining the value a group has proves either very diﬃcult or actually 
impossible. Why they think this and what their responses are to this is where 
they diﬀer.!
! !
Section 3.A – Are all cultures equally valuable? 
! !
‘Romantic naturalism’ (Taylor, 1997) is the notion that all cultures are 
equally valuable, both for their members and for the wider society and the state. 
Taylor’s definition of it is: !
“…what is picked out as of worth here is a universal human potential, a 
capacity that all humans share. This potential, rather than anything a person may 
have made of it, is what ensures that each person deserves respect. Indeed, our 
sense of the importance of potentiality reaches so far that we extend this 
protection even to people who through some circumstance that has befallen them 
are incapable of realizing their potential in the normal way—handicapped people, 
or those in a coma, for instance. In the case of the politics of diﬀerence, we might 
also say that a universal potential is at its basis, namely, the potential for forming 
and defining one’s own identity, as an individual, and also as a culture. This 
potentiality must be respected equally in everyone.” (Taylor, pp.41-42, 1997).!
As all groups are equally valuable to the individuals within them, it is 
argued that all should be equally welcome and protected. From a communitarian 
point of view, no one else is capable of telling groups what the best conception of 
the good is and how best to achieve it. In this sense, because they think the value 
of groups cannot be determined or judged by anyone external to the group, then 
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all communities and cultures have equal value in relation to one another. As a 
result, judging certain groups to be worse than others does not have any merit and 
is discriminatory. Some argue that it is hard to see how all cultures couldn’t be 
seen as equal. Johnston (pp.186-187, Kymlicka ed., 2007) notes that the idea of 
groups having the right to self-preservation is becoming more widely accepted, 
both within the state and in international law. If this is the case, it is possible to 
argue that if cultures weren’t all equally valuable, then not every group would have 
the right to self-preservation. Only the ones deemed of the greatest benefit to 
society as a whole would be ensured of safety. But that is not the way things are or 
should be in modern liberal democracies, every residing group should have a right 
to continued existence. This can be seen in the attachment to ethnicities and 
groups that most people still have, despite the march towards political unity and 
citizenship. People usually aren’t willing to give up or be separated from their 
group or nation (Kukathas, chap.10, Kymlicka ed., 2007). It is unlikely that they 
would appreciate being told that their culture or group is deemed less valuable 
than others and not worthy of protection.!
! When it comes to minorities specifically, as I’ve said already it is been 
argued that it is not possible to determine if some are more valuable than others. 
That said it is even quite hard to determine genuine MCs and communities from 
mere associations and interest groups. This matters as while all groups are equally 
valuable from a communitarian viewpoint, not all associations count as fully-
fledged groups. While associations and interest groups can aid and support MCs, 
it is the MCs that have a guaranteed right to self-preservation, not the 
associations. It is important to be careful when identifying minority and identity 
groups; otherwise it is possible to be guilty of ‘lazy racism’ by regarding them all 
as one. Gutmann (2003) thinks this is made easier however by the ‘mutual 
identification’ within MCs. Individuals within those groups will share interests, as 
communitarians argue any collective shares in the same interests and ends. But in 
the case of identity groups and MCs, each member mutually identifies with every 
other member of that group and with the group as a whole. In interest groups, 
the members are only bound together through chosen shared interests. This 
should make it easier for the state to determine groups that deserve state 
protection, particularly minorities. Again, this only lets us define which groups   	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constitute MCs and does not tell us anything about their value, but given that is 
regarded as being impossible this is sufficient from the communitarian 
standpoint.!
!
Section 3.B – Rejection of equal value theory 
! !
A lot of liberal egalitarians authors reject this idea. Not only do they think 
that cultures can have varying value, but that any attempt to politicise said 
cultures is potentially dangerous. The public and private spheres should be kept 
separate as far as possible, as it is not the state’s role to interfere when it comes to 
the right to association, unless it is forced to due to illegal activity or a breach of 
individual rights.!
! If diﬀerent cultures do vary in their value, liberal egalitarianism first has to 
provide a reason as to why this is. Because cultures and groups are not seen as 
possessing their own distinct entities, any benefit that is produced benefits 
individuals. There is no inherent value in the group itself. If so, then it should be 
theoretically possible to determine the benefit each individual gets from a group. 
This is obviously still hard to accurately measure, especially as there will be some 
individuals in every group who do not benefit or even suﬀer as a result of their 
membership. But it is still within the realms of possibility, in contrast to the 
communitarian view. And as the focus is on the benefit to individuals, it is also 
possible to determine the impact that groups can have on those not in the group 
as well. This is obviously useful, as it seems obvious that there would be some 
groups that benefit their own individual members but hinder or cause negative 
consequences to other individuals. It is easy to think of examples of groups the 
majority of society sees as being damaging and immoral without being illegal, for 
example fascist or extreme parties. While they enjoy support from their own 
members, they are seen as degrading and threatening to certain sects of society. 
But if they do not break any laws, then there is no mandate for anyone, including 
the state, to intervene. At this point it is possible for critics to intervene and 
argue that the example I have just given does not apply to MCs. Because 
individuals have a choice about whether to join, and because once members they 
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  25
that it is easier to determine the value of a voluntary interest group. They have 
clearly defined interests and intentions, and a simple evaluation should be enough 
to determine the value they will have both on their members and on others in 
society. When it comes to MCs however, critics think that it is not as 
straightforward. Firstly, membership of them is largely involuntary which makes it 
harder to dismiss their group as having no inherent value. Secondly, the interests 
of an MC aren’t nearly as clear-cut as those of an interest group. There is a wider 
array of interests and ideals held by individual members. As a result group 
membership will be beneficial to some, and damaging to others. Assigning the 
MC as having a set value is therefore much harder as a result of having to take all 
these factors into account. !
 Determining the value of groups may be diﬃcult, but it is still not 
impossible. It is true that members of MCs are likely to hold diﬀerent interests 
and ends, a point I made the case for earlier in this paper. Particularly in a large 
enough group it becomes diﬃcult to pin down a set value. But with immigrant 
MCs it can be the case that they are small enough in terms of membership to 
determine the value or otherwise provided for members and citizens external to 
the group. One instance that comes to mind is the resettlement of rich Russians 
and Middle Eastern oil tycoons to western cities such as Paris and London. On 
one hand, their wealth and fortune is taxable and provides an economic benefit to 
both cities and their respective national governments. The majority of the 
tycoons and oligarchs will have moved out of choice, and maybe some in order to 
escape political pressure or enemies. But on another view, these MCs have 
contributed to a housing crisis in the cities by pushing up the prices of houses and 
accommodation in the centre, forcing ordinary citizens to move further and 
further towards the suburbs. So it seems like one should be able to calculate a net 
sum of gains versus costs and come up with a verdict as to whether it is beneficial 
or detrimental overall.!
! This would work if I used a utilitarian approach to determine which MCs 
were best for a society and should be welcomed, and which ones were harmful. 
But this is not the case for liberal egalitarianism. Just because MCs are not seen as 
having equal value, and it is potentially possible to determine the value of each 
one, it does not mean that they can or should be ranked so society can pick and   	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choose which ones to keep. As each MC is made up of individual members, those 
individuals all have individual rights and have to be treated ‘diﬀerence blind’. 
Regardless of their group membership, and if that group has net positive or 
negative value, they have the same right to remain in society. This is not to say 
that other citizens cannot form opinions as to whether one particular MC is 
more valuable than another, but they can take no action to eﬀect any change 
regarding those minorities without breaching the individual rights of the 
members. This will be properly examined in the next section.!
!
! So far then I’ve argued that groups and group membership are valuable in 
that they tend to provide benefits for and improve the well-being of the 
individual members of those groups. They are only valuable in this way though, as 
there are no distinct group entities that exist above their members, no collective 
body that has its own values or interests. Groups provide a structure that yields 
certain goods that most individuals find beneficial, and can influence the choices. 
However, individuals still have the freedom to choose what good they find 
valuable, and can reject these societal goods if that is what they desire. As societal 
goods are only valuable insofar as they are valuable to individuals, then it is likely 
that certain cultures are more valuable than others. It is even possible to 
determine how much value a certain MC has to both its members and outside 
individuals. To act upon this or restructure society in a certain way to 
accommodate this fact however would impinge on the individual rights and 
freedoms of those members. If people are born into involuntary groups, then they 
should not be at fault if the majority of society deems their group or culture to be 
a negative one.!
! The next section will look at whether members of MCs require any 
protection in order to prevent the above scenario from occurring, and if they do 
what form(s) it could take.!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 2 – Protection and rights 
!
!
Membership of MCs and groups generally is understood as being mostly 
positive for individuals. If so, then it is a good idea to ensure that these groups 
survive and are able to flourish, something that it is hard to imagine many people 
disagreeing with. But do MCs require any extra protection above that of the 
majority or dominant groups? And if they do, what is the best practical way to 
implement this protection? The debate this paper has been looking at so far has 
largely consisted of communitarians on one side advocating the both the 
importance and value of groups as entities in themselves, and liberal egalitarians 
emphasising the primacy of the individual. As it stands in liberal states, all 
individuals possess the same rights and freedoms. But when examining more 
practical considerations, the sides of the debate aren’t as clear. Authors who fall 
broadly into a liberal egalitarian framework can still advocate extra protection for 
MCs even just for the benefit of the individuals within them, for example.!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
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Section 1 – Protection and status!
!
Section 1.A– Positive arguments 
!
There are various reasons given as to why MCs require extra protection 
and status within liberal states, both negative and positive. Starting with the 
positive ones, it is argued that states need to be active in ensuring that MCs are 
sustained and given room to flourish. As Taylor puts it, the state has “Positive 
duties to sustain a culture of freedom” (Taylor, 1997). Mere toleration and passive 
acceptance of MCs is not enough to be certain that the members of MCs will 
gain the same benefit from living in a liberal state compared to members of the 
majority group. Communitarians on the whole want to ensure all groups receive 
suﬃcient protection in a liberal state, but some like Taylor go further and 
advocate active promotion of MCs. This is for the benefit of both individual 
members, to put them on the same playing field as the majority of individuals in 
society, and for the benefit of the group itself in making sure of its continued 
survival. The reason the dominant cultures and groups do not need any extra help 
or promotion is because they already occupy top status. If anything, 
communitarians argue dominant groups should be the ones helping the state to 
promote MCs and oﬀering concessions if needs be.!
! On a similar note, Laborde (2012) observes that granting MCs extra 
promotion and status is a useful tool to encourage greater interaction and debate 
between dominant and minority groups. If MCs feel like they aren’t going to be 
marginalized, it is likely they will be more willing to open up and share their 
experiences. This in turn helps prevents cultural misunderstandings and hopefully 
reduces any tension between groups. Some liberal theorists such as Brian Barry 
are accused of failing to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent MCs, instead classifying 
them within a single group. This is seen as being unsympathetic towards MCs, 
and shows a failure to engage them in debates and conversations about societal 
matters on the presumed basis that MCs as a whole have nothing to oﬀer in those 
debates. On the face of it most would agree that this is a short-sighted approach 
to democratic issues. A more cohesive and tolerant society is something to strive 
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for, so it is arguably worth granting extra protection to MCs in the short term in 
exchange for a level playing field in the future.!
!
Section 1.B –Negative Arguments 
! !
Those are the positive arguments showing how liberal states could be 
improved further than they are currently are. The majority of arguments in favour 
of granting extra protection for MCs are negative, in that they maintain that 
MCs in most societies currently struggle to get even their ‘fair share’ (equal) of 
civil rights and freedoms. As Kymlicka puts it (chap.9, 1989), they do not “get 
even their dues.” Dominant cultures and groups have extra layers of security and 
protection, which is normally enshrined in the constitution and the legal system 
as a whole. In nearly every instance, liberal states were developed by members of 
the dominant groups in society, without any consultation of MCs. Gutmann 
(chap.1 , 2003 ) c la ims that most members of MCs are fundamental l y 
disadvantaged in politics and the general business of the state. Having to deal 
with an alien and strange culture, and quite possibly in a diﬀerent language a lot 
of the time can make an already diﬃcult process even more stressful for members 
of MCs. The structure of democracy in a liberal state is largely dependent on the 
dominant culture of the state, as it is very diﬃcult for the structure and apparatus 
of government to be completely neutral with regards to groups and cultures. This 
is especially true of liberalism, as the entire structure is designed around 
prioritising individual rights over the greater good and wellbeing of particular 
groups. That is fine if a group operates in this manner and individual freedom and 
autonomy is emphasised, but in some MCs and particularly ones that originated 
in non-liberal states this may not be the case. Trying to gain meaningful 
representation and acceptance can be diﬃcult if internal structure of an MC is 
very diﬀerent to that of the state, further increasing marginalization. Gutmann 
also claims that another reason this is problematic is that membership of 
democratic states is nearly completely involuntary in the modern globalised 
world. There are non-democratic states, but they’re in the minority and are often 
regarded as being worse oﬀ when it comes to measures such as living standards 
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some forms of media and popular thought is not very realistic. This argument 
goes back even as far as Hume’s analogy of a man being kidnapped aboard a 
vessel, and in what sense he is actually free to leave. It is unreasonable to ask 
members of MCs to leave if they have contentions with the structure of 
democratic systems if they practically do not have anywhere else to go.!
! A second negative argument often given is that not only do members of 
MCs struggle to get an equal footing in liberal states, but that people and their 
cultures are in danger of being assimilated into general liberal culture and 
structures entirely. Andrew Wright, in a review of Barry, argues that liberal 
assimilation is tantamount to a modern form of neo-colonialism carried out 
through ideological and intellectual means, backed by existing liberal state 
structures, instead of violence and conquest (Wright, 2004). Wright is not the 
only one to hold this view. Van Dyke (Kymlicaka, ed., 2007) maintains that 
liberalism when practically applied is assimilative and destructive. Even defenders 
of individual rights, such as Laborde and Gutmann, accept that the liberal state 
can have a tendency to try and assimilate MCs, particularly ones where the 
members tend to be in disagreement with the general discourse and structure of 
the state. This is a disputed point, as defenders of liberalism such as Barry will 
point out that ideally the liberal state is neutral with respect to the well-being and 
flourishing of groups. But critics are quick to highlight examples where this is not 
the case. Laborde (2012) points out that liberal states can be over hasty in using 
legal policies to penalise aspects of MCs that are seen as undesirable, for instance 
in the case of the banning of religious clothing in French schools. This is possible 
evidence of liberal states being overly paternalistic in a detrimental fashion, done 
in the name of maintaining individual autonomy and freedoms. Again, defenders 
of liberalism would argue this wasn’t done in the name of paternalism, but instead 
to promote secularism in accordance with the French constitution and state 
tradition. The idea that liberal states want to eradicate MCs through assimilation 
is perhaps too strong an attack on liberal thought, as even though liberal theory 
does not account for groups it still places heavy emphasis on individual choice 
and the freedoms required to maintain it. But negative consequences can occur 
even without complete assimilation. Leslie Green (chap.11, Kymlicka ed., 2007) 
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into something they’re not. And in a liberal state it could prove very challenging 
to convince individuals in these MCs to revert to the old traditions and ways of 
their groups. This is particularly troubling for those writers who still hold groups 
to possess distinct entities above that of the aggregation of their members. If the 
fundamental nature of the group is changed, then that entity will cease to exist.!
! Finally, and possibly the most vital argument given for ensuring the 
guaranteed status of MCs and their members, is that if the state ultimately has 
authority over members of MCs and thus the MCs themselves due to their 
established diﬃculty in participating in state mechanisms, the dangers of 
nationalism become a real possibility. Van Dyke (Kymlicka ed., 2007), an always-
staunch critic of the current structure of liberalism, asserts that liberalism is 
reluctant to grant extra status to groups that aren’t in line with the dominant 
culture of that state. If the benefits and status quo of society are always slanted in 
favour of the dominant culture, then it eﬀectively gives the state more and more 
power to use against members of MCs. Gutmann (chap.1, 2003) agrees. Nothing 
should justify the absolute authority of the state over the individuals within it, 
particularly not against those who happen to be members of MCs. Situations like 
this are often made worse as a result of the fact that dominant cultures allow for 
and on occasion even encourage intrusion into MCs and their members, often in 
the name of upholding the security of the state. The reason this has the potential 
to be that much more dangerous than mere assimilation is that rather than 
convincing MC members to adapt and fit in with the dominant culture, they can 
be forcibly expelled from said state and in the worst instances, targeted with 
violence with the ultimate aim of destruction. Instances of these happening are 
well known and well documented, so I won’t go into detail. But the case can be 
made that in response to these happenings, greater strides have been made to 
accommodate members of MCs and their cultural diﬀerences, and while there are 
still problems occasional clashes, authorized persecution of minorities by 
supposedly liberal states appears to be on the decline.!
!
! There are a number of issues that I maintain the above arguments do not 
fully address. Firstly, examining Gutmann’s love it or leave it criticism, how 
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Gutmann and Kymlicka who focus on issues of minority identity and democracy 
look at a wide range of minorities in various situations and of various 
backgrounds. Kymlicka (1989) in particular looks extensively at the plight of 
indigenous minorities, particularly in Canada. This paper is focused mainly on 
MCs who have immigrated to l ibera l s tates . As a result , i t i s not so 
straightforward to rule out the option of returning to their native states and 
countries. Obviously the precise scenarios in which this can happen have to be 
laid out very carefully in order to avoid any accusation of discrimination or 
racism. In the case of political refugees and asylum seekers, it is at once clear that 
they have no options to go to another state or return back to their original one, as 
they were forced to leave their original state and culture, and in most cases under 
distressing circumstances that probably greatly reduced their practical options. 
This becomes even less likely for second and third-generation immigrants, who 
may still retain strong cultural ties to their native culture, but do not have any 
form of citizenship rights there having been born in a separate state. In most 
cases of economic migration, it is hard to deny individuals the chance to 
substantially improve their lives, and while not quite in the same boat as refugees, 
their economic status often leaves them with few other options as well. But it is 
perhaps easier to make a case that for relatively well-oﬀ and skilled migrants who 
immigrate to liberal states and then complain the dominant culture is too alien 
and does not fit with the mechanisms of their group, they do have an option to go 
elsewhere or return back to their state and culture of origin. This may seem 
excessively harsh and I will examine it further in the next section, but having 
respect and tolerance for members of MCs does not have to equal deference 
towards them. So while ‘love it or leave it’ is not always a realistic option, it does 
not mean that it is never possible.!
! Secondly, many writers listed above make the case that assimilation of 
MCs and their members into liberal culture will be damaging and even 
destructive. These arguments aren’t without merit, but the bigger underlying 
question is why liberalism as a dominant culture would want this to happen. If 
liberals focus on the primacy of the individual and individual autonomy, then 
there is no practical reason to force individual members of MCs to abandon their 
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lot more desirable than actively forcing people to abandon their native cultures. 
The main problem with this view is when liberal culture and MCs clash, but 
ideally this should only happen when the autonomy and freedom of individuals in 
those MCs is not properly upheld. For example, if the culture is one that denies 
its members individual autonomy and freedom of choice, things that are 
incompatible with a liberal system of individual rights. Other members of MCs 
might have complaints about this, but it is a bold claim to say that upholding 
individual freedoms of all members within an MC is tantamount to destructive 
assimilation. !
! A third response is to the claims of a lack of protection leading to 
dangerous nationalism. While this has historically occurred, it is arguable that by 
the time it gets to the point where members of MCs are actively expelled or 
damaged, it can no longer be a liberal state authorizing and aiding these measures, 
but some form of dictatorship or authoritarianism. While liberal states can be 
seen as lacking extra protections and rights specifically for members of MCs, that 
is only because the primacy of the individual comes first. In a scenario where MC 
members are suﬀering under the state, that is in direct contradiction with the 
many individual rights that are supposed to be the foundation of the liberal state. 
So it is arguable that lack of MC protection can allow nationalistic factions to 
develop to an extent, but any scenario where these factions gain control and act 
against MCs would not be considered liberal. If anyone were to make the strong 
claim that liberalism is directly at fault for failures of this scale towards members 
of MCs and people in general, it would be easy to refute them simply by referring 
back to the primacy of the individual.!
!
Section 1.C – Extra protection not required. 
! !
A lot of the arguments for extra protection of MCs in the previous section 
aren’t inherently flawed, but they are based on the premise of groups as distinct 
entities. If that is held to be false, as some writers believe, then arguments as to 
why members of MCs do not require extra protection are easy to construct.!
!
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! Again, the positive ones will be examined to start with. First is Barry’s 
argument that the system of individual rights adhered to in liberal states are 
universal, and part of a universal system of justice (Barry, 2002). They’re not 
culturally relative, and so should apply equally to all individuals regardless of 
groups. Extra group rights for MCs cannot be extended or asserted because 
according to Barry group rights do not exist in this system of justice, and even if 
they did they’d have to be applied equally to all groups. This is obviously a strong 
meta-ethical claim, and one that is looked at again in section 2.B, but if this 
underlying justification holds then rights and justice become entirely about 
individuals, eliminating the need for group protection.!
! A slightly diﬀerent tack is that it is not the case that group rights do not 
exist, just that they’re unnecessary in liberal states. Kukathas (chap.10, Kymlicka 
ed., 2007) asserts that liberalism essentially put minorities first anyway and is 
geared towards protecting them, as the whole point of individual rights is to 
guarantee the safety of people from the will and actions of any majorities that 
could occur. If a system of individual rights didn’t exist to provide a safeguard, 
then the will of majority has complete authority over every citizen of the state. As 
it stands, trying to harm a minority group involves harming the individuals in it 
which is contravenes their individual rights. There is not a necessary need to 
depart from individuals in order to guarantee justice for all groups in society, not 
just minorities. Admittedly there are still instances where members of MCs do 
suﬀer from injustice, but that can be due to individuals failing to uphold the 
justice system properly rather than the actual structure of the system itself. 
Rather than throwing away what currently exists it should try to be upheld to the 
required standard.!
! Another might be that if Waldron’s cosmopolitan theory is correct, then 
specific protection for MCs is not required as none or very few people identify 
themselves with a single group. MCs and groups dying out is no longer the 
existential threat it is perceived to be. Individuals will instead draw influences 
from other still existing cultures rather than face a complete loss of identity, 
heritage and unity. If it holds that individuals aren’t defined by a single culture, 
then the disappearance of MCs only becomes problematic if all of them vanish 
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are ascriptive characteristics that make it diﬃcult to integrate, it is still possible 
and so individuals shouldn’t be forced to associate with their initial groups forever 
(Gutmann 2003). This comes across as a rather selfish argument, as it portrays 
individuals in liberal states as not caring what happens to MCs as long as they are 
able to get their cultural ‘fix’, regardless of the wellbeing of anyone else. The 
argument also assumes that everyone in a liberal state does not identify 
themselves with a single group, which while it is becoming more common 
definitely is not the case for all individuals. While the cosmopolitan theory is 
interesting, it would be misleading to take it as being advocated in this paper. On 
the opposing view however, this is exactly the reason why MCs require 
protection. The homogenisation of diﬀerent cultures obviously removes the key 
diﬀerences between them, which some argue defeats the whole purpose of 
cultural identity and multi-culturalism. If there is no distinctiveness between 
groups, then the benefits of a multi-cultural society cannot be realised. One or 
two token elements and traditions may be taken from each, but the actual 
boundaries and cultural diﬀerences will be worn down to the point of non-
existence. !
!
! More of the arguments about why extra protection is not required are 
negative, mostly focusing on the importance of the individual over that of any 
group. Whenever MCs and multiculturalism in general is politicised, it has the 
potential to undermine the system of universal justice, both legal and moral, that 
Barr y claims is the foundation of l iberal states. By saying people are 
fundamentally diﬀerent from one another by virtue of their culture, and that the 
system of justice needs to reflect this, then diﬀerent standards are required for 
diﬀerent people contradicting the whole point of universal justice. While most 
changes tend to be ones to accommodate small cultural rituals or specific pieces 
of clothing, it could be argued that this creates an opening for other more 
significant laws to be changed, which is problematic for the notions of personal 
responsibility and equality under the law. While approaches like this can be 
successful, they have the potential to backfire either when creating exemptions 
from laws for MCs, or when upholding a universal law without taking into 
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judge in the UK who said that an Indian man beat his child due to a lack of 
cultural understanding and this should be taken into account, despite the man 
having lived in the UK for an extended period of time (Barrett, 2015). This is the 
focus of Laborde’s (2012) paper examining religious dress in secular state 
institutions. If granting or removing exemptions aren’t successful, they can cause 
deeper divisions and resentments between diﬀerent groups in society. If universal 
standards can be upheld consistently and constantly, then it becomes harder for 
people to complain. Some minority members could still claim that liberal justice 
is itself a form of cultural dominance, but as has been said before, liberal theorists 
such as Barry would respond by maintaining that liberal justice and egalitarianism 
is not culturally relative. It is just the best system available for ensuring the 
wellbeing of people as individuals in society, from a purely neutral perspective.!
!
! This leads on to a second problem. By granting extra status for MCs and 
minority groups as wholes, it can mean protection is withdrawn from individuals 
in those groups (Barry, 2002). Priority should lie with individuals, not the groups 
themselves. If groups are granted exemptions from standards of universal justice, 
then individuals in those groups are not entitled to protection from the actions of 
the group itself. Some writers think this is not an issue. MCs are viewed as 
vulnerable, so there would be no sense in using their exemptions to oppress some 
of their own members. This is part of the ‘relative power’ argument, where 
dominant groups are seen as being the only groups capable of oppression due to 
the disparity in power (Green, Kymlicka ed., 2007). This argument is rather naïve 
in assuming that disadvantaged groups are always justice friendly regarding their 
own members. Green points out that MCs can be relatively weak in their social 
standing but still possess the capacity for intolerance and oppression. This can be 
particularly true for immigrant MCs where women do not enjoy the same legal or 
moral rights as male members do. This may be acceptable in the original state or 
group, but in a liberal state every individual is in possession of the same status and 
rights. A notable recent example was the banning of pupils from lessons at a 
Hasidic Jewish sect school in London after they had been driven to school by 
their mothers (Sabur, 2015). While not the direct result of a legal exemption, this 
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applied to certain MCs. With this particular incident there has been a large media 
backlash, and is currently being examined by the state’s lawyers. Even if the 
Hasidic population of the UK is proportionally small and thought of as being 
more vulnerable than dominant groups, it does not prevent a disparity of 
standards and status from occurring between its own members. Diﬀerent 
arguments over how much this actually occurs and what to do about it will be 
looked at in the next section on the mechanics of any potential protection. It is 
also problematic when defenders of the priority of MCs argue that the focus on 
individual liberal rights clashes with the wellbeing of MC while, as Barry points 
out, those defenders are holding individual rights themselves and expect them to 
be upheld.!
! A secondary feature of this argument is that by granting exemptions and 
extra status to groups, it is automatically being assumed that diﬀerences between 
diﬀerent groups in society will never be overcome (Gutmann, 2003). This is not 
saying that assimilation is desirable and something to actively work towards, but 
that individuals from all groups and cultures have the potential to work together 
to avoid misunderstandings and prevent clashes, without having to necessarily 
revert to the legal system. But if extra group rights and standards are not only 
accepted as being morally permissible but are also enshrined in law, then it is an 
admission that individuals from these different groups are inherently 
fundamentally diﬀerent from those in the majority group, a diﬀerence that 
cannot be reconciled. Again, communitarian writers would see this as inevitable 
due to the role group culture has in shaping an individual’s identity and how that 
experience will be fundamentally diﬀerent to an individual of another group. My 
response to this is the same one given earlier in this paper, that this disregards an 
individual’s autonomy and their ability to choose their own way in life. Someone 
might be born into a particular group but not share the same interests as the 
majority of members. They may want to move away from their group of origin 
and into a diﬀerent culture, but might struggle to do so if they’re subject to 
diﬀerent standards through no desire of their own. It is diﬃcult change your 
identity, as is seen in Waldron’s theory, but individuals shouldn’t be denied the 
opportunity to do so by additional group-focused protections.!
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! A third point is that if there were to be any extra protection given for 
members of MCs, it needs to ensure that it is for the benefit of the members 
rather than protection of group culture or heritage just for the sake of it. As 
Kukathas (chap.10, Kymlicka ed., 2007) puts it, just because an MC is historically 
prior, it does not equate to a right to continued existence. Every individual and in 
turn member of a group has a right to self-preservation and continued existence, 
but that does not entail that the state has to ensure the survival of every cultural 
tradition and heritage of groups residing within the state. An apt comparison that 
can be made here is with religions. In a liberal state, individuals have freedom of 
worship and religions have a right to exist as far as they can sustain themselves. 
But it is not the state’s responsibility to ensure the survival of a religion that is 
losing members at an irreversible rate and headed towards a total decline. In some 
liberal states this is not always the case, such as the UK where the monarch is 
both head of state and head of the Church of England. A better example is 
France, which has had strictly enforced secularism in state institutions for 
centuries. If this is the case for religions, why shouldn’t it be the same for MCs? 
Arguably they both have significant influence on the identity of their members 
and influence the choices they make. Communitarians would probably respond 
by saying that it is because people have been shown to flourish without religion, 
i.e. atheists, but they cannot survive without their culture. This is contentious and 
lacking in any definitive proof or evidence, as liberal theorists could point to 
hermits and others who flourish in solitude. While it is arguable that hermits tend 
to emerge from predominantly religious backgrounds, it is easy enough to 
imagine those who choose to retreat from society at large whilst not engaging in 
any cultural activities. Of course, some religions are inherently associated with 
certain MCs, which could be used to further justify my argument but is usually 
used as a reason for implementing extra protection. But a lot of the fears over the 
disappearance of religious minorities concern instances of them being persecuted 
and attacked, which goes against the individual rights of the members of the 
minorities. And if the state is only responsible for the survival of the members of 
MCs rather than the shared of heritage of them, then no additional status 
appears to be required. Obviously, this does not entail that the state should have 
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an active hand in eradicating cultures that are on the decline. But it does not 
entail any obligation to save them either.!
! Whilst on the topic of religions, Gutmann (2003) makes an interesting 
comparison that is worth mentioning briefly here. As I said above, religions often 
overlap with or are regarded as versions of MCs. As such, they are often granted 
exemptions and extra status not aﬀorded to individuals, for example particular tax 
breaks, exemptions from medical requirements etc. But it is not like individuals 
cannot be moral or beings of conscience outside of organised religions. Many 
individuals are pacifists or humanists and hold equally valuable moral positions 
without any connection to a religion of faith. If the importance of religion is the 
influence they have on individuals’ identities and choices, it seems that a person’s 
moral convictions have equal weighting, and should be treated as such. There are 
two actions that could be taken to deal with this. First, the exemptions granted to 
religious organisations could be extended to all individuals of conscience and 
moral worth. This would fail for two reasons: extending an exemption from a law 
to everyone equates to the abolition of that law, which may not be the desired 
outcome, and that it does not seem possible to determine which individuals can 
be regarded as beings of conscience and which cannot. Religions at least have set 
aims and goals, which while not always adhered to, at least are clearly set out and 
recognisable. The other option would be to remove any and all exemptions for 
religious groups that could be applied to all individuals as well. This seems like the 
more promising option, particularly for writers who believe in both state 
secularism and universal justice standards. But to work out how best to do this 
would presumably be a long and complicated legal process, with all the diﬀerences 
between individual and corporate/group tax structures. Some would argue that 
this is a measure too far, and that some of the exemptions granted to religions are 
to provide practical aid for their charitable work, particularly in liberal states 
where religions largely remain free from persecution. It is not a question of 
ensuring religions possess the same status as other groups, but ensuring that they 
are able to continue with the active aid they provide to others in society; 
something I assume most people would want to continue.!
!
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I have talked about protection as if it is a completely defined concept. But 
there is debate as to how far the definition of it should be extended and exactly 
what it should be protecting against. Laborde (2011) rightly points out that there 
will be diﬀerent types of protection depending on the context. If it is an issue of 
genuine justice and legality, such as discrimination against the members of an 
MC, then providing extra legislation or initiatives to combat this is definitely a 
sensible option. But if groups and MCs start demanding protection against the 
possibility of merely being oﬀended, the issue starts to become more diﬃcult to 
resolve. There have been numerous instances recently concerning oﬀending MCs, 
most notably the Danish and Charlie Hebdo cartoons that oﬀended Islamic 
communities and the violent responses that followed. Laborde’s understanding, is 
that while serious oﬀence against MCs can be seen as a breach of moral justice, 
this does not and shouldn’t automatically equate to legal penalties. Being shielded 
from oﬀence is not an individual right, as it has the potential to severely impinge 
other individual’s rights to free speech and thought. Gutmann (chap.1, 2003) 
writes that respecting MCs and their members does not equate to deference and 
kowtowing. Granting extra sovereignty to MCs can be a license to impose both 
internal restrictions on members and make requirements of others not in the 
group. It is important to be careful when decisions are made about whether to 
give MCs extra status. At the same time, this means that the state shouldn’t have 
the ability to interfere in cultures to repress or dismiss aspects they find oﬀensive. 
Cases such as the banning of religious clothing in school can be justified as 
reinforcing individual autonomy and egalitarianism, but is often seen as the state 
attempting to undermine cultures and groups it finds morally oﬀensive. If causing 
oﬀence does not equate to legal penalties, then the state shouldn’t interfere with 
cultures the majority finds oﬀensive.!
!
Earlier in the paper I discussed whether the government had an obligation 
to actively promote MCs, and concluded that the complications of doing so made 
it too diﬃcult. The other course of action open to the state and the rest of 
society is toleration. Cases of oﬀence between diﬀerent cultures and groups, and 
points I made in chapter 1, indicate that the argument that all cultures are equally 
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being of lower value, it does not mean action should be taken against those ones 
that are deemed bad. This is what Laborde advocates when she says society has to 
tolerate those MCs that are morally distasteful and repugnant to the majority of 
other people in society. But at the same time, there’s no requirement for the state 
to go about promoting these cultures either. If the majority of society is opposed 
to a particular group, it is important to make sure the members of the group are 
suﬃciently protected but not to extoll the virtues of the group. In other words, 
allow for cultural diversity but do not go so far as to actively promote a plurality 
of cultures.!
There is a potential issue with adopting a policy of toleration. As with 
promotion, by virtue of living in a pluralist society there will be clashes and 
disagreements between groups over various matters. Not to the same extent as 
there would be if the value of all groups were promoted, but still some. My 
response is that toleration shouldn’t be disregarded as a policy in fear of 
disagreement between groups. If anything, it should be promoted in order to 
prevent disagreement, particularly if disagreement between groups threatens to 
turn violent. If there are any individual disputes over status and legislation, it is 
what the courts and legal system of a liberal state are designed for. Of course 
some writers might argue that the justice system in a liberal state is going to be 
biased towards the dominant culture of liberalism, but this view is again 
dependent on whether liberalism is believed to be culturally relative or not. 
Writers like Barry argue it is just the best way to organise a society.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Section 2 – Types of Protection!
!
! Even if the argument can be made that extra protection is not required to 
uphold justice for members of MCs, it is still worth examining the diﬀerent ways 
in which any potential protection could be implemented. The three types I will 
be looking at are again dependent on prior beliefs about the importance of 
individuals versus groups, and the issues of interests and entities concerning 
them. Having already established the weaknesses of the arguments on the 
communitarian side, these will make it easier to point out flaws in the ways they 
suggest for the extra protection of groups. I still maintain that the protection of 
members of MCs requires no more than a diligent and consistent upholding of 
individual rights, but those who prioritise groups will obviously disagree.!
!
Section 2.A – Collective Ends 
! !
If communitarian writers believe that the well-being of groups is prior to 
that of individuals, then upholding individual rights is not going to be enough to 
ensure the protection of groups as distinct entities. Van Dyke (Kymlicka ed., 
2007) states that liberalism is not able to explain certain collective features and 
goods that come through groups, at least not through its focus on individualism 
and individual rights. It is claimed the benefit produced as a result of upholding 
individual rights cannot compete with the greater good of allowing groups to 
improve their own well-being (MacIntyre, 2007). If this means breaching 
individual rights, then it is worth it to ensure the interests and the ends of groups 
are met. These particular writers argue that the status quo in liberal states forces 
people to accept a system of rights rather than being able to satisfy their goals and 
ends through their particular group or community. The claimed result is that 
isolated individuals are left restricted in their ability to achieve their ends as they 
are unable to successfully obtain the unique goods group provides, and the well-
being of groups suﬀers dramatically both in terms of their member’s interests and 
the interests of the group as an entity.!
!
  	  43
This is a controversial position, and as a result is vulnerable to strong 
criticism. As I wrote earlier, the idea that groups are entities with their own 
distinct moral interests above that of its members does not seem to hold. Moral 
interests seem to be reducible down to the moral interest of the individual 
members. Even if groups were entities, trying to determine what their interests 
and ends are would be very diﬃcult, and the writers that defend it do not oﬀer 
any methods as to how this would be calculated. Giving groups and cultures 
sovereignty and control over its members on the basis that they’re entities with 
distinct interests is hardly justifiable when those entities; a) might not exist and b) 
even if they did exist, it is very hard to determine what those interests are and 
how they should be best satisfied.!
Even if the notion of distinct entities is removed, there are still problems 
with this view. Arguing that the benefit of a group has priority over the well-being 
of any individual in it is a form of utilitarianism. This is obviously not inherently 
bad, but it does raise problems when it comes to justice, particularly in liberal 
states where the individual has priority over groups. Utilitarian reasoning is 
consequentialist, a failing of which is that there is no diﬀerence between persons. 
Individuals just become part of the calculation for the overall happiness and 
wellbeing of the group, and in turn become expendable to that wellbeing. It could 
be that a form of rights based utilitarianism is used in order to try and minimize 
rights violations. But given that writers such as Van Dyke are so keen to point out 
how limiting liberal individual rights can be in terms of seeking the maximum 
benefit that can be gained from group membership, it seems unlikely that their 
form of utilitarian reasoning would be one that sacrifices a chance to maximise 
the greater good of a group in exchange for protecting a system they find limiting 
and isolating. This returns to the points I made earlier about internal oppression 
and intolerance in groups. Removing individual rights altogether would only 
increase the potential capacity for it. This is problematic not only for internal 
oppression, but any argument in support of the priority of collective ends over 
rights could be applied to the state as an entity too. This would allow the state to 
treat all groups, including MCs, as a means to achieving the best overall wellbeing 
for the state. But the whole argument for extra protection for MCs in the first 
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satisfying their interests, as well as preventing any possibility of active oppression 
from dominant groups and cultures. Advocating that collective ends be prioritised 
could also mean giving the state complete control, which would prove dangerous 
for MCs and their members.!
Of course, most writers who argue for this would assert that prioritising 
group interests would only be applicable to groups within society, not the state 
itself, and that groups have mandates to satisfy their interests up until the point 
where doing so would impinge on the interests of another group. But outside of 
self-identification it can be diﬃcult to determine what constitutes a full MC or 
community. And without rights, it does not seem possible to ensure that a group’s 
interests aren’t hindered. This is why most writers who are in favour of group 
protection argue a system of group or collective rights is required instead.!
!
Section 2.B – Group rights 
! !
Supporters of the priority of collective ends do not think it is possible to 
have both rights and the ability to satisfy interests. Gutmann disagrees. She 
maintains that the idea that we have to choose between a complete embrace of 
satisfying ends and a complete independence from them is wrong (Gutmann, 
1985). It is possible to pursue and satisfy interests and ends within a system of 
rights, rather than having to give them up completely. But some supporters of 
communitarianism and other group-inclined writers still maintain that individual 
rights in liberalism do not completely protect the interests of MCs and their 
members. Therefore they argue a system of group rights is required in tandem 
with already existing individual rights.!
! What reasons are given? Van Dyke (Kymlicka ed., 2007) again states that 
there are certain goods that cannot be protected using liberal rights. The 
examples he gives are of the right to national self-determination and group-wide 
consent. Individual rights are not applicable because these are not fundamentally 
individual acts and concepts – they rely on collective action and cooperation. This 
may explain the non-individualization of certain goods, but does not address the 
idea of groups as distinct entities. Johnston (Kymlicka ed., 2007) makes two 
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should have a right to self-preservation just like every other entity (i.e. 
individuals) does. This has to be limited to recognised groups and MCs; otherwise 
any free association of individuals would require the same protection. And 
secondly, even if groups aren’t separate entities, if an individual’s well-being is tied 
to their membership of a particular group, then a case can be made that the group 
should have its rights recognised within liberal theory. Up until now, any form of 
group rights has been accommodated within individual rights. Rather than being 
purely collective rights, they are individual rights collectively asserted. But 
because there is no specific mechanism for upholding stand-alone group rights in 
a liberal system, these collective rights are held subordinate to individual ones. 
This is thought as inevitably antagonistic as it is very probable there will be 
clashes between this type of group rights and individuals, in which case the 
interests of the individuals are given priority over the group. Writers who reject 
this scenario argue a new system of group rights is required.!
! !
There are a variety of concerns that need to be addressed when trying to 
formulate a system of group rights. Hartney’s (Kymlicka ed., 2007) overview is the 
clearest and most succinct that I have found of these issues. The first is 
attempting to answer the conceptual question of whether it is possible for groups 
to hold rights in the first place. Writers and supporters of the notion of groups as 
distinct entities will evidently think it is. If an entity has its own distinct interests 
and ends, as well as being a necessary aspect of their members’ well-being, then it 
should have the rights that can protect those interests. The second question 
raised is the substantive question; if it is possible for groups to have rights, do 
certain groups or communities in fact have these rights that protect their 
existence? Communitarians argue that they do not, not as it stands. Any rights 
that have been granted to specific groups are individual rights collectively 
asserted; they do not apply to the groups as their own entities. It is a subtle 
distinction. In legal rulings, a group is treated as a single defendant, akin to an 
individual, rather than a separate entity. A clear example of this is the notion of 
Corporate Personhood in the US legal system (NPR, 2014). They are granted 
rights in the same way that an individual would be, which theorists argue does not 
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  46
Speaking on the topic of legal rulings, another distinction that needs to be 
made when looking at rights is the distinction between moral and legal rights. 
Moral rights are morally important and relevant goods/values/interests that have 
suﬃcient reason for protection in the name of justice. Whereas legal rights draw 
their authority from the legal institutions they are issued from and upheld by. The 
link between the two is important, as moral rights help to inform the creation of 
legal rights in many cases. There are legal rights that aren’t linked to any 
particular moral right, so it is not an absolute requirement in the law. But showing 
that entities are capable of holding certain moral rights is normally good grounds 
for assigning them legal rights. !
In terms of the legal rights supporters of group entities think are required 
for suﬃcient protection, they fall into two main categories: external protections 
and internal restrictions. External protections are designed to prevent potential 
oppression from the dominant groups in society and overrule any majority-based 
decisions concerning MCs and their members. The lack of proportional 
representation of MCs in the workings and institutions of the state makes them 
more vulnerable to factions within the state using it as a vehicle against the 
members of those MCs. As Laborde has already said, the state shouldn’t use 
legislation to penalise cultures it disapproves of, but it can and has happened. For 
example, the constitutions of eight ‘Bible-Belt’ states of the USA prevent atheists 
from holding oﬃce (Schwarz, 2014). These restrictions haven’t been enforced 
since 1961, but the fact that they remain in the formal constitutions is still 
worrying. Obviously atheists are not ascriptive migrant MCs, but this is an 
illuminating example. External protections would go a long way to prevent this, 
particularly if there is a way for the state itself to be held accountable over them. 
The second form of protection that groups are said to require is internal 
restrictions on its members. Rather than protection from oppression, these are 
designed to uphold the cultural integrity and general wellbeing of the group by 
preventing members from certain actions that could prove detrimental. If the 
group’s interests are more important than any individual, then restrictions are 
justified in the name of ensuring continued existence. Freedom for both the 
threat of external oppression and internal decay would in theory allow groups to 
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flourish in whatever way they deem best, something that can really only be seen 
as a positive by communitarians.!
!
Just because these protections are possible, it does not automatically 
follow that they should be instituted. Again there is a potential confusion 
between respect for MCs and deference towards them. Even Barry, the arch 
defender of liberal egalitarianism, conceded that there can be some form of group 
rights. But that does not mean groups and MCs can be given free reign both over 
its members and to act as they please. Barr y’s (2002 ) restrictions are 
straightforward. Members of MCs do not have the right to break laws that 
protect other individuals. This is straightforward protection of individual rights 
equally throughout society. Even if members of MCs think that their culture 
should have active requirements on others in society, any attempt to force others 
to uphold these requirements is considered a breach of individual liberty and 
their rights. Even the most ardent communitarian should be able to accept this 
without controversy, as there has to be a limit to how far the demands of MCs 
can be accepted. The second restriction he advocates is that any individual who 
wishes to leave a group for whatever reason should be protected in their right to 
do so. This is in direct opposition to the internal restriction group rights that 
some MCs argue for.  Presumably in some cases, one of the restrictions that could 
be placed on MC members is punishment for leaving and failing to participate in 
the group. This could include social rejection, confiscation of property or 
holdings, and others. A common term for it is shunning, and in some groups and 
cultures it is seen as a perfectly legitimate punishment for not subscribing to the 
general culture of the group. But immigrant MCs are on the whole ascriptive, 
their members have defining features that tie them to the group that they did not 
choose and would struggle to change. If an individual chooses to no longer 
associate with other members of the group, it is not up to the group to prevent 
this. This is not an issue with voluntary groups, as voluntary entry implies on 
option for voluntary exit as well. Any voluntary group that tries to prevent this 
through force or illegal methods can be rightfully regarded as something similar 
to a cult. In the case of MCs, assigning them enough rights to restrict individuals’ 
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abilities to leave on the basis of involuntary characteristics could be equally 
unjustifiable in a liberal state.!
! At this point, defenders of group priority might make the case that the 
right to eﬀective exit does have to be in place, but that is the only exemption 
required from internal restrictions. If individuals have an eﬀective right to exit, 
then it is argued that they can choose to leave the group if they do not agree with 
the general culture and methods of the group. How far this argument actually 
holds up is unclear. Firstly, when discussing the reasons why extra protection is 
needed for MCs previously in this paper, I pointed out that the ‘love it or leave it’ 
argument is viewed with hostility with many people and writers, including people 
on both sides of the debate. This is partly due to the notion that it is seen as both 
disparaging and patronising to those who choose to make what is normally a 
diﬃcult and stressful life choice. But it is also because the option to leave is not 
normally a realistic one. That applies equally to individuals within an MC as it 
does to MCs within a state. If a person’s entire social circle, livelihood, property 
and in general existence is tied into a culture or group into which they had no 
choice about being born into or associated with, it is not realistic to ask them to 
abandon it all on the basis that they disagree with restraints on their individual 
liberty, particularly if those are being justified on the grounds of protecting a 
distinct entity that cannot be shown to exist separate from its members. 
Defenders of liberalism could argue that if a group is this controlling in nature, 
individual rights provide a useful role in restricting the activities of this sort the 
group carries out. Even if it was only justified on the basis that those restrictions 
are for the greater benefit of all the members of the group, the notion of 
individual freedom is still being compromised, something that does not seem 
compatible with the basic principles of the liberal state. Some writers use this 
argument as evidence that justifying restrictions on individuals is not feasible in 
any sense, and so the only form of protection groups and MCs can aim to have 
are external protections. Both Kuthakas and Green make the case for this in their 
respective articles (Kymlicaka, ed., 2007), and even liberal writers sympathetic to 
groups such as Kymlicka and Gutmann argue that individual rights need to be 
strengthened in MCs, not relaxed (Kymlicka, 1989, Gutmann, 2003).!
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Some communitarians might reject this argument if they reject the value 
of individual choice in favour of the value of group cohesion and well-being. But 
as Kukathas (Kymlicka ed., 2007) claims, because they’re in a society that does 
value individual choice, the argument cannot be used to justify internal 
restrictions in that way. Hartney goes further and claims that internal restrictions 
cannot be applied at all. Setting aside any current substantive legal rights groups 
may have concerning internal restrictions and focusing on the conceptual 
possibility that groups can have moral rights regarding internal restrictions, 
Hartney denies that groups can ever hold rights over their individual members 
(chap.9, Kymlicaka ed., 2007). Going back to the discussion about competing 
values of interests, he claims that only individual interests have any morally 
relevant value. Therefore, only individuals can hold the moral rights designed to 
protect these. It is a matter of protection of individuals against the whole. Using 
the state as an example, he argues that the state cannot have moral rights against 
its own citizens, as everything the state does is for the benefit of individuals 
within that society. Even the legal restrictions it places on citizens are not derived 
from the moral rights of the state, but from the moral rights of each citizen to be 
protected from harm and the harmful actions of others. Any rights or privileges 
the state is seen to have come from the unique procedural manner in how it is 
chosen by the citizens, i.e. formal elections enshrined in the constitution. This 
can be seen as enacting the aggregated will of the majority of people within the 
state. No other group is entitled to these sorts of privileges in the same way that 
the state is. The rights and standing of the individual supersede that of any group. 
This links to the argument I have endorsed throughout this paper, that any moral 
relevant claims associated with a group are reducible to the aggregated moral 
claims of the individual members. If only individuals hold such moral claims, then 
individuals are the only ones that require moral rights. It is already been pointed 
out that there is a diﬀerence between moral and legal rights. Determining who 
holds moral rights only informs the creation of legal rights, it does not determine 
it completely. In theory, a state has the power to grant legal rights to any person 
or group it sees fit to do so. But this can be a diﬃcult process if the holders aren’t 
in possession of any moral rights to begin with, as the process may be seen as 
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restriction will be contravening the moral rights of those individuals, without any 
moral grounds themselves. !
! If internal restrictions are ruled out, then MCs could at least still benefit 
from external protections. If a community or culture is deemed to be valuable to 
its members, it is arguable the state could have a duty to protect it. But having 
just established that groups are unable to hold moral rights, it does not initially 
make sense as to why the state would have a duty in the first place. The answer is 
that the duty is to each member of that group, rather than the group itself. 
Individuals have the right to try and preserve their groups and cultures, and the 
state has the duty to uphold that right as long as any attempt is legal. This is 
another instance of individual rights collectively asserted, rather than the group 
itself having a form of collective rights. It may seem odd at first, because 
preservation of a group is a distinctively collective eﬀort rather than an individual 
one. But not every right that is exercised collectively has to be jointly held by the 
people it is applicable to. If so, then it seems group rights are neither possible nor 
actually required to protect MCs.!
!
Section 2.C – Other options 
!
Individual rights then are the only ones capable of protecting members of 
MCs, because only the interests of individuals are morally relevant, and also the 
only ones needed. Any discrimination or prejudice that members of minorities 
suﬀer is not then the result of a failure of the liberal system of justice. It is instead 
a problem of personal bias in other individuals or institutions. On one hand 
trying to prevent this would be straightforward. The right to not be discriminated 
against based on cultural or ascriptive characteristics is a legal right in most 
liberal states, which is informed by a moral right to not have their interests 
dismissed or disparaged out of hand. When minority members suﬀer harm, their 
rights are already being breached. Adding a system of extra rights is not going to 
help if an individual right has already been compromised. What needs to be done 
instead is to uphold the already existing system to a higher standard with a greater 
level of consistency. The actual legal mechanisms of how this could be carried out 
are varied. Greater punishments if found guilty of discrimination, greater   	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education and debate to reduce tensions between members of diﬀerent cultures 
and groups, press for more balanced coverage in the media, etc. 
!  !
! The fact that a universal system of moral justice is required in liberalism 
does not mean that it is not possible to accommodate cultures in certain ways. It 
is possible with legal standards regarding certain cultural aspects and 
characteristics, such as laws governing religious clothing, to be relaxed or altered 
if it will be to the benefit of the members of MCs and not to the detriment of 
others in society. As moral standards only inform legal standards, not dictate 
them, legal standards can be altered if the situation calls for it. It is up to the 
discretion of the authorities rather than the system of individual rights. As the 
problem of discrimination and injustice has to be solved at its root, anything that 
can make members of both MCs and the dominant groups more comfortable 
with each other and promotes greater understanding is something that should be 
sought after. If this means relaxing certain laws to make members of MCs feel less 
oppressed without comprising universal moral standards of justice, then this 
seems like the most promising method. A successful example of this is the recent 
decision by the US army to relax uniform regulation for religious minorities 
(Constable, 2014). The problems come when the moral standards informing the 
laws are changed for the benefit of a specific group. Some individuals will feel like 
they are being held to a more rigorous standard than others, purely on the basis of 
being an involuntary member of the dominant culture. Not only would this 
impact on people’s ability and autonomy to fulfil their ends and interests, but it 
also leads to the possibility of creating even deeper divisions between diﬀerent 
cultural groups in society. The relaxation of legal standards, if done carefully and 
with consideration to universal standards of moral justice, could have the positive 
eﬀect of creating dialogue and reducing misunderstanding between groups. This 
in turn would help to alleviate any discrimination or bias on a personal level, at 
least in theory. There will always be individual cases of discrimination and 
injustice suﬀered by MCs, but those injustices can be rectified through upholding 
the individual rights every citizen is entitled to in the legal system.!
!
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Conclusion 
!
There have been many disagreements in this paper over just how valuable 
groups are for individuals, whether groups are distinct entities and in what ways 
the members of those groups should be protected. But most of the writers in this 
paper agree that members of MCs often suﬀer from discrimination and injustice 
relative to the rest of society, and that something should be done to rectify this. 
Working on the basis that groups are valuable only in that they’re valuable for 
individuals, that they’re not distinct entities and so cannot hold their own sets of 
rights, the best option that remains is careful and considered relaxation of certain 
laws governing cultural characteristics and other similar issues. Hopefully this will 
allow members of MCs to retain some sense of cultural connectedness in a 
foreign society and improve any sense of isolation. In doing so, it should improve 
relations between members of diﬀerent groups, reducing misunderstanding and in 
turn lessening any instances of injustice and discrimination on the basis of group 
membership in society. As long as no moral standards of universal justice are 
altered or compromised while attempting to do this, it should be possible to allow 
for cultural diﬀerences while ensuring that every member of the state is subject to 
the same morally relevant standards in their attempt to satisfy their ends and 
interests.!
! Some people will argue that this solution does not go far enough in 
attempting to rectify the injustice members of MCs suﬀer. The injustice caused 
by diﬀerences between groups will always be too diﬃcult to overcome through 
relaxation of minor laws for minorities in the hope it’ll reduce misunderstandings, 
and in turn promote cohesion. They may be right in the fact that such instances 
of injustice will never be completely removed, but that is the price for the 
benefits of living in a culturally plural liberal society whilst still retaining a 
universal system of individual justice. The fact that there are such diﬀerent groups 
in society yet they are still able to function together pretty successfully on the 
whole is a credit to liberalism and liberal states. While it might not be possible to 
protect minority members from all the injustice and unfairness that comes as a 
result of their group membership, this method would attempt to solve the 
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reasons for injustice and intolerance at their core by promoting greater 
understanding, while at the same time maintaining the universal standards of 
justice that are the foundations of a liberal state.!
!
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